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Book Reviews
This Honorable Court. By Leo Pfeffer. Beacon Press, Boston: 1965.
Pp. 434. $10.95.
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education' through Baker v.
Carr' and Engel v. Vitale3 and up to Miranda v. Arizona,4 a barrage of
criticism has been leveled at each successive Warren -Court decision,
contributing to the erection of a cordon of judicial protection around
civil rights and liberties. The critics have charged that the Court, 'in its
desire to guard personal freedoms, has not only vitiated the principle
of stare decisis and demonstrated a dearth of judicial deference toward
the doctrine of federalism, but also has usurped executive and legislative prerogatives by making fundamentally political decisions. The
attack on the Court has taken various forms, including bills to limit
the ambit of judicial review, petitions to impeach Chief Justice Warren,
a declaration of opposition endorsed by thirty-six State Supreme Court
Justices, and proposed constitutional amendments, the most notable of
which is the current proposal sponsored by Senator Dirksen to overrule the reapportionment decisions.
The hullabaloo over the Court's civil liberties decisions -has obscured the fact that traditionally the Court has been the guardian of
property, not personal rights. From the time of its -inception until
1937, the Court, with almost missionary zeal, had sanctified and protected property rights and economic interests regardless of how they
may have collided with and truncated personal freedoms. Chief Justice
Marshall, a staunch Federalist, 'believed that the preservation of property rights was a primary function of government, and, through his
decisions, he provided carte blanche for the nation's economic expans-ion. The Taney, Fuller, White, Taft, and Hughes Courts followed
suit invalidating numerous laws affecting property interests on the
ground that the laws either violated the contract impairment clause or
the due process clause. One might recall that Chief Justice Taney justified his Dred Scott 5 decision on the ground that slaves were property,
and thus their disposition could not conflict with the constitutional
provision that no person shall ,be deprived of property without due
process of law.
The 1917 case of Buchanan v. Warley6 presents an interesting
and, in light of -the current controversy over open housing legislation,
timely example of our earlier Courts' preoccupation with the protection
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

3. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
6. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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of property rights. In Buchanan, a white man, who had contracted to
sell his home to a Negro, brought an action for specific performance.
The Negro claimed that the contract could not be effectively consummated 'because a local ordinance prohibited Negroes from moving into
white neighborhoods. The Court invalidated the ordinance, but not
because it patently discriminated against the personal rights of Negroes.
Rather, the Court overturned the law for violating the due process
clause by infringing upon the constitutional right of a white man to
dispose of his property as he saw fit.7
Decisions such as Buchanan which were premised on the preservation of property rights and which were quite oblivious to the preservation of personal freedoms are now, of course, relics of the past.
(The reviewer personally believes that the nation is much the better
for their passing.) The judicial revolution of 1937, which witnessed
the Court's abdication of its traditional role as guardian of property
rights, marked their end and paved the way for the libertarian spirit
of the Court of today. This and more Mr. Leo Pfeffer brings to light
in This Honorable Court, an opinionated account of Supreme Court
history.
Mr. Pfeffer tells us that .the current unpopularity is by no means
unprecedented. In fact, the current assaults upon the Warren Court
are not in either substance or design really very different from the
attacks upon our earlier Courts. However, the change in judicial
preference for personal rights over property rights has resulted in
a wholesale 'switch in sides among the Court's critics and defenders.
Mr. Pfeffer observes that today represents one of the few periods in
Court 'history when the attacks upon the Court have for the most part
emanated from the right side of the political spectrum rather than
from the left.
Mr. Pfeffer apparently agrees with Mr. Dooley's satirical observation that ". . . th' supreme coort follows th' illiction returns."
He begins his book with the proposition that the Court, when it
renders constitutional decisions, 'is no court at all. Rather, he contends,
it acts as a legislature engaged in shaping the moral, political, and
economic patterns of America. Here, 'he says, in this political involvement, lies the 'source of -the Court's unpopularity. Mr. Pfeffer perceives the Court as being interwoven in the political fabric of our
country and, without passing judgment, accepts this as a political fact
of life. He writes, "For -better or for worse, the Supreme Court is
one of the nation's major political institutions and there is no way it
can be insulated from the nation's major political controversies."
Mr. Pfeffer remains faithful to this theme throughout his discussion of the pre-New Deal Courts. He pictures our earlier Courts
as 'being super-legislatures in the area of economic legislation. However, in discussing the post-New Deal Court, particularly the Warren Court, 'he changes course. He says that Justice Black's appointment
7. The decision is now considered to have been based upon the Negro's personal
rights. See Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent in Communist Party v. SAC Board, 367
U.S. 1, 186 (1961).
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to the Court in 1937 was the harbinger of the Court's abolition as a
third branch of the legislature. And the abdication by the Court of
its role in protecting economic interests changed the Court's entire
political complexion. He says that since the judicial revolution of
1937, the Supreme Court "has become a court, and is no longer a
branch of the legislature."
The reasoning Mr. Pfeffer employs in characterizing our pre1937 Courts as legislatures and our post-1937 Courts as judiciaries
is tenuous. He bases the distinction on the ground that today's
judicial activism occurs when the Court merely steps into a vacuum
left by legislative ,i-nactivity, while in -the past the Court engaged in
judicial activism 'by directly overruling acts of Congress. And he
asserts that in the -area of civil rights and liberties, the Court must
step in and act because the legislatures won't, the reason being that
the laws infringing such rights also often operate to restrain those
attempting to 'influence remedial legislation. In the mind of the reviewer, when the Court departs from prior judicial authority and by
necessity or otherwise creates law, it is, in reality, just as much engaged
in legislating as when it overturns Acts of Congress.
Present members of both the liberal and conservative wings of
the Warren Court have accused the Court of doing just that. Dissenting in Reynolds v. Sims' (a reapportionment case), Justice Harlan
said:
The Constitution is not a panacea for every blot upon the public
welfare nor should -this Court, ordained as a judicial body, be
thought of as a general haven for reform movements . . . This

Court, limited in function in accordance with that premise,
does not serve its high purpose when it exceeds its authority,
even to satisfy justified impatience with the slow workings of
the political process. 9
And quite recently, in Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections1"
(the poll tax case), the same charges of legislating were leveled against
the majority by none other than Justice Black. Castigating -themajority
for failing to apply stare decisis and for overturning Virginia's poll
tax, Black said:
For Congress to do this [overturn the poll tax] fits -in precisely
with the division of powers originally entrusted to the three
branches of government - Executive, Legislative and Judicial.
But for us to undertake in the guise of constitutional interpretation to decide the constitutional 'policy question of this case
amounts, in -my judgment, to a plain exercise of power which the
Constitution has denied us 'but has specifically granted to
Congress."
8. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
9. Id. at 624-25.
10. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
11. Id. at 680.
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The point is that the Court, as recognized in the Harlan and Black
dissents, is still legislating, though in a different manner than before.
Mr. Pfeffer's assertion to the contrary is not only unrealistic but
also a departure from the central theme of his book.
Mr. Pfeffer characterizes the Court as a "three-fold paradox,"
that is, a court exercising important political functions, making
enemies but withstanding any attack upon its status, and obtaining
compliance -to its decisions without any direct means of enforcement.
He then poses a question: "Where does one find the solution for the
riddle of a court that exercises political power not possessed by any
other tribunal and yet has no means whatsoever at its disposal to
defend that power if it were seriously challenged?" And he suggests
that the answer -to the riddle is to be found in ,his book.
The -reader is first led to believe that the answer lies in the
Court's sensitivity and responsiveness to prevailing public opinion,
but then 'he is told that the Court has succeeded because of its ability
to withstand the shifts in popular passion and to shape the patterns
of the nation. He is led to believe that it would be suicidal or disastrous
for the Court to depart from prevailing public opinion, but then he
is told that despite the unpopularity of some of its decisions the Court
has remained practically unscathed and that the Court now has in
its defense the American -people. He is led -to 'believe, as noted earlier,
that the Court acts more like a court than ever before, but then he
is told that the present Court has more often ignored the principle
of stare decisis -than ever before. And so on. In short, I've read Mr.
Pfeffer's book, but nowhere was I able to find that promised answer.
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the book has quite a bit to
offer. It animates many a decision which, 'in *my mind's eye, had
theretofore existed solely within the four-corner confines of a casebook. It also provides the reader not only with a good understanding
of the social and economic ramifications of a constitutional decision
but also with considerable insight into the political nature of Court
activities. Unencumbered by a heavy scholastic style, the book is
well-written and makes for enjoyable reading. Though certainly not a
reference 'book, This Honorable Court should be found stimulating by
both the law student and the lawyer.
Stanley G. Mazaroff*
* B.A., 1960, University of Maryland; LL.B., 1965, University of Maryland;
Editor, Maryland Law Review, 1964-1965.
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Modern Bankruptcy Manual Law And Practice. By the Lawyers
Co-Operative Publishing Company, Rochester, New York: 1966.
Vols. I, II & III. $68.50.
The compulsion a woman feels to buy a new hat every time she is
faced with a problem, real or fancied, must be 'similar to the constraint
legal publishers feel -to publish whenever some area of law appears
to present any difficulty actual or illusory to the practitioner. It doesn't
seem to matter what the difficulty may be or whether the new publication will serve any useful purpose with regard to the problem.
Few would deny that there are enormous problems in the field
of ,bankruptcy law and practice, and The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Company in its new three volume treatise entitled Modern
Bankruptcy Manual ,says it is addressing itself to what it thinks these
problems are; however, because the publishers seem not to understand
the difficulties and because -the essence of these difficulties are not
curable by any publication, Modern Bankruptcy Manual falls far short
of its purpose.
Bankruptcy cases arise because a person or a corporation finds
itself unable to pay its debts when due. These claims normally are
forwarded to various collection agencies, which -in turn send them to
their own attorneys in due course for legal action. In a city such as
Baltimore, there are no more than four firms handling any volume
of diversified collection accounts, and this situation is by no means
atypical in other cities of comparable size and structure. Thus, if a
debtor is unable to pay his debts in a manner acceptable to a very
few attorneys, he is likely to find himself faced with some form of
involuntary liquidation. More often than not, the great mass of claims
will ,be concentrated in two or three of these attorneys 'who will "work
the matter out" between themselves. Most attorneys are bored with
collection work and would not do it even if they had the opportunity.
The economics of collection work make system and volume imperative. The so-called "prestige" firms do not handle collections,
except on a limited scale on 'behalf of valued retained clients, partly
because collections are normally billed on a contingent basis, and 'these
firms prefer to bill on a time basis. It follows naturally that since
collection accounts precede the 'bankruptcy, the attorneys doing collection work 'become the bankruptcy lawyers. So the lawyer, whose day
is already consumed with routine demands for payment, mass law
suits, remittances, and all the other mundane details of the collection
cycle, is further burdened with the administration of a 'bankruptcy case.
Something must be relegated to the background, and too often it is
the academic aspects of bankruptcy. Few bankruptcy cases involve
profound legal issues, and the practical aspects of the administration
very often compel practical solutions short of the academic determination. From the moment the case is filed, all attention is focused on
closing it. It is doubtful that any publication could supply the answers
or even guiding principles for operating in this context.
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The editors of Modern Bankruptcy Manual obviously have not
attempted to compete with the two definitive treatises on 'bankruptcy,
Collier and Remington; indeed, they have merely editorialized the text
material in American Jurisprudence2nd and bound the forms relating
to bankruptcy in American Jurisprudence Pleadings and Practice in
the third volume. While not every law office will possess American
Jurisprudence, virtually every library will have some general legal
encyclopedia which will have at least two volumes dealing with bankrutcy in a manner approximating that of the Modern Bankruptcy
Manual. Certainly, the active bankruptcy practitioner will not be satisfied with its "headnote" approach, but will lean more heavily upon
the more studious -Collier -orRenington.
Few practitioners will ever have an opportunity to represent a
client in a bankruptcy case beyond the mere filing of a proof of claim
or, even more rarely, to represent a bankrupt. Bankruptcy cases are not
born in a vacuum; the people who hold claims file the proceedings
and elect themselves trustees and are represented by bankruptcy practitioners. It would seem that the 'limited universe of potential buyers
would have discouraged Lawyers Co-Operative from going to the
effort and expense of the publication, since it fills no void nor does
it provide any answers for those already active in the field.
If one can separate the publication's lack of justification for
existence from the publication itself, and if it is possible to ignore its
failure to meet its declared purpose, Modern Bankruptcy Manual is
not without merit. The text material is extremely readable and is
couched in uncomplicated language, so that almost anyone, lawyer
or not, can understand it. Subject matter is very often treated in much
the same fashion as a case note would be; that is, in short, terse statements, with some tips on procedure interspersed. The footnotes key
the reader right into the Bankruptcy Act, the forms, the General
Orders, 'and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where applicable.
The publishers tell us that the purpose of Modern Bankruptcy Manual
is "a practical approach that brings every lawyer the ability to handle
virtually any bankruptcy matter." Of course, case authorities are
cited for -the legal propositions presented, but, as in any case where
text material is presented in bold, broad statements or principles, the
presentation is not only not definitive, 'but the cases cited do not generally by themselves stand for the precise principles stated. Seldom is
consideration given to exception, nuance, or shading. To a lawyer not
familiar with 'bankruptcy the mere statement of the rule is not enough.
It must be obvious to the reader that it was physically impossible
to read every word of all three volumes, or to verify 'the accuracy
of the text or citations; the approach used in this analysis was to
try to find answers to several simulated problems. Generally, the index
was found to be quite satisfactory, and little difficulty was experienced
in finding whatever the editors had to say on the subject; unfortunately, the more complex the problem, the less satisfactory was the
answer obtained. The inescapable conclusion 'is that the approach was
deliberately superficial and that the editorial purpose was directed
more to answering "how" questions than to "what" questions. If
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it were not for the cost ($68.50), this work would make a satisfactory
text book to be used in conjunction with a law school course in
bankruptcy.
Although it may appear that this review is needlessly critical, such
is not the intention. Any -tool which can make the practitioner's task
a bit easier is worth having; unfortunately Modern Bankruptcy
Manual fails by almost any standard ,for 'both practitioner and specialist,
and it is doubtful it will enjoy wide use.
Jerome M. Asch*
* Partner in Melnicove, Asch, Greenberg & Kaufman, Baltimore, Maryland;
B.S., 1946, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1949, University of Maryland.

